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REPORT

SUBJECT Comintern and Cominform Influence

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a study on the influence of the Comintern and the Cominform on Hungarian political life. The Comintern is identified as a Soviet instrument, first used in supervising and educating tens of thousands of émigrés in the Soviet Union, and later directing their activity, upon their return to their native countries, in the interest of Soviet imperialism and Soviet intelligence. Jenő Landler, Bela Kun, Matyas Rakosi, Zoltan Vas, Aladar Tomas, Pal Sandor, György Veres, Rezső Szanto, Bela Szanto, Frigyes Karikas, Ander Berei, Imre Horvath, Jozsef Revai, Zoltan Szanto, Ernő Gerő, and others are named as having worked for the Comintern. In contrast, the Cominform is represented as mainly a propaganda organization which was supposed to demonstrate the existence of a forum of world Communism.

2. While the study hardly qualifies as current intelligence, it should be of interest to students of the methods of international Communism.

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

The influence of the Comintern-Cominform in Hungary.

After the first world war the Russians found it necessary to create an organisation which could direct the communist parties in different countries all over the world, respectively to organise the communist parties in all those countries where the communist, at that time formed only a fraction of the social democratic parties. At the beginning, this second task was the more important because this time there were independent communist parties only in a few countries. In theory this "Kommunistische Internationale" or in its abbreviated name "Komintern-Comintern" assured equal rights to all its members, and in the central machinery in Moscow the representatives of every communist party participated. This organisation really had a directing, guiding role. In fact, even internationalism was considered seriously at this time. It is characteristic for instance that the Hungarian RAKOSI played an important role in the founding of the [] Communist Party, respectively in the ^{organising} ~~beginning~~ of the [] Party. At the beginning of the 1920s the Comintern meetings and work was more or less based on democratic foundations. This meant that the propositions of the individual parties were listened to, the individual peculiarities of the different countries were considered, and the necessary propaganda was planned accordingly. Namely, the Russian communists ^{believed} in the possibility in fact even in the victory of a world revolution, or at least in a general European revolution. Lenin considered the whole Russian structure primitive and expected improvement from the revolutionary successes of the Western countries and in the first place of Germany. He declared several times that the real socialist order will be realized only later together with the industrially more developed Western countries, respectively with their communist parties.

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Exactly by this reason, in this time within the Comintern, in fact even within the interior life of the Soviets the German communists and other foreigners also played a significant role. 50X1-HUM

However, this idyllic situation did not last long. After the failure of the Hungarian communist regime and the isolated communist uprisings the Soviet leaders realized that the time of the world revolution apparently did not arrive yet and within the Soviet communist party that fraction became dominant which wanted to consolidate the socialist system first in Russia and dealt only a secondary role to the activity of the foreign parties, respectively evaluated the work of the Western parties only to the extent of their support to the Soviets. Finally, as Stalin came to power and the power machinery of the party consolidated, the Comintern became a simple executing organ. The political decisions were resolved by the Politbureau which also drew the party line and the duty of the Comintern consisted only of enforcing this party line and to embrace itself against any particular deviations in the different legal^{ly} and illegally operating foreign parties. Therefore from the beginning of the middle of the 1920-es there were permanent personality fights and deviation or fractionalism struggles in the Comintern Leadership. Only those elements were considered reliable who executed the Soviet party instructions and orders with military precision and discipline even if they knew that the orders were in contradiction to the interests of the party represented by them. On the other hand, anybody became unreliable who, though considering Russian interests, dared to call attention to the facts that application of different tactics might be necessary in other countries. During the great purges the actual or suspected opposition was exterminated from the ranks of the Comintern and this organisation became one of the agencies of the Soviet might or the NKVD. 50X1-HUM

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One of the duties of the Comintern was the direction, supervision, education and even the provision of the foreign emigres living in Moscow. This in its substance might have seemed an administrative task, however, later experiences proved, that the Comintern achieved the greatest successes on this field because by giving appropriate jobs and livelihood to several tens of thousands of emigres it attached a great majority of them not only to communism but to the Soviet Union. After the second world war these former emigres were and remained in every country the most faithful servants of the Russians.

The effect of the Comintern activity to the political life of Hungary was minimal ^{between} ~~during~~ the two world wars. In general the role of the communists in this period could be termed as completely insignificant, in Hungary. The membership of the illegal party amounted to about 2-3000, and mostly consisted of intellectuals, but the majority of them, inexplicably dreamed about the realisation of an idealist socialist system and not of the transplantation of Soviet methods. Besides, they had very scanty ideas about the Soviet reality. The one dimension negative propaganda of the Horthy system was unproductive toward the thinking people, and many saw a certain heroic romanticism in the Soviet experiments. In the beginning of the 1920-es the Hungarian communists gained their faith from the negativism of the Horthy system. The bloody repressions after the Kun Bela regime, the police tortures, the various terroristic organisations supported the convictions of the communist much more than ^{the} Comintern propaganda ever did. In these years the faithful were mostly recruited from these persecuted, tortured, people, pushed aside or coming home from foreign emigration who had no ambition at all, for whom there was no hope at all. Only around the end of the 1920_{es} and in the beginning of the 1930-es joined

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the illegal movement a handful group of young intellectuals who were looking for remedies of the economic crisis and searching for the solution on this road against the flagrant injustices of the existing social conditions. However, this had no country-wide effect. We can assuredly say that the communist cause was kept up in Hungary primarily by the police in order to prove its own importance, respectively to sustain the justification of existence of the really anti-democratic regime.

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The above related fact should be never forgotten when we try to explore the role of the Comintern in Hungary. The activity of Comintern agents had hardly any effect on the Hungarian social life. It touched a few dozen people, and the result of their work appeared really only after 1945 and even then only in cadre matters.

In August 1919, after the fall of the Hungarian Communist regime, the leaders escaped from Hungary. At that time the emigree Hungarian communists had two centers in the world; Moscow [] Moscow meant; close connection with the Comintern, material independence but at the same time complete subservience. [] signified harder living conditions, greater individual and thinking liberty and in the first place proximity to Hungary. Naturally, in theory even the Vienna emigration acknowledged the leading role of the Comintern, but professed that their policy and in the first place their men could serve the aims of socialism better than those of Moscow who were already detached from the Hungarian conditions. The two fractions carried a hard struggle against each other. The most important man []; LANDLER Jene former social-democratic lawyer of Budapest, in Moscow; KUN Bela, the former head of the 1919 communist regime of Hungary. Between the two, LANDLER was the more intelligent, in fact even the more honest. Therefore, it is natural that KUN Bela

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tried to do everything in Moscow to discredit LANDLER

He (KUN Bela) as a secretary of the Comintern had greater possibilities and used these primarily for the annihilation of his enemies. It was said - and this is not at all doubtful today when we already know the Soviet methods - that he played active part in denouncing Hungarian communists who were returning clandestinely to Hungary. The slogan of Party Unity even in the beginning era was a complete cover for the committed scandals. Anybody, anytime endangered the Party Unity if he proved to be in opposition of those in power.

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In the middle years of the 1920-es the leadership of the illegally operating Hungarian communists was completely in the hands of those in Moscow. In Moscow, respectively in the Soviet Union there were a fairly large number of Hungarian emigrants. Their position was generally favorable; the 1919 events left such a deep impression on the Russian communists that many of the refugee Hungarian received important posts. On the other hand the communists in Hungary regarded their party comrades who returned from Moscow as their real leaders and submitted themselves to the instructions received even if they were incomprehensible to them, or if they seemed harmful. This could not have been in any other way because at this time there were only "adherents" left in the party, who regarded Moscow as the new Rome of the new faith and believed the dogmatics even if they were not understandable. The organizational structure of the illegal party was very adaptable for this kind of discipline because the simple members in general did not know the leaders and only were in contact with their immediate superior or immediate subordinate colleagues. There was no possibility at all to express any contrary opinion.

The founding of the so-called Vagi-party (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party) was the first substantial function of the Comintern in Hungary, in 1925. It is probable that RAKOSI or VAS Zoltan gave the orders for the forming of this party. Namely, around this time the Comintern relieved RAKOSI from the Western line and trusted him with the organising of the illegal Hungarian party. However, he worked on this job only for a short time because together with VAS he was arrested by the police.

Anyway, around this time the already mentioned party came into existence and this occasion was an excellent chance to denounce to the Hungarian police all those communists who perhaps were not known yet to the police. Namely, the membership of the illegal party had to participate actively in the VAGI open movement. Many people of the illegal movement declared that this was an intentional master-stroke of KUN Bela, respectively of the Russians to eliminate the elements that were still loyal to LANDLER and the Viennese group. At this time, by the way, idyllic conditions reigned in the relation of communists and the Hungarian police. Four-five political detectives handled the communist cases and these were practically all known personally by the party members - all of them wore dark blue suits, black derbies, and walked around with large walking canes - complete check was kept when and where these detectives were transferred, but on the other hand - as police investigations revealed - the detectives also knew the personal circumstances of the party members in fact they knew even at what time a member bought a new pair of shoes or a necktie for himself.

The Vagi party had no success. It had a few hundred members and after a few months activity the government ordered its dissolution, not so much on police evidence but on the request of the social-democratic party.

A considerable number of the members were arrested and the jovial detectives 50X1-HUM
tortured them adequately.

All this, however, did not change the situation substantially - the Comintern, respectively its agents became absolute masters of the Hungarian communist movement. Even if the political effect of the Comintern was insignificant in its country-wide relation, as we have already mentioned that before, its significance and influence toward the party members became more and more important.

The secretariat of the illegal Hungarian communist party was the directing organ of the movement. Generally the secretariat had two members, one repatriated from Moscow trained in Hungarian activity, and another Hungarian secretary. Naturally the directing member was the former the "foreign secretary" who gave his instructions or decisions or sometimes sent them, because it also happened that this "foreign secretary" did not reside in the country, but was located in somewhere abroad, mostly in Czechoslovakia. It was necessary to employ a Hungarian secretary, to have somebody to keep the actual, sometimes personal contact with the Hungarian communists, and for if something goes wrong to have a scape-goat toward the Russians. Generally, it was required that the Comintern, [the foreign] secretary should spend six months in Hungary and six months abroad. The Cominter provided for the material need of the secretaries because the Hungarian communist party had no income. The membership dues were small really only nominal although there were members coming from well-to-do families or persons of good income whose donations however, were used for the expenses of literature, printed matter, pamphlets, etc.

With this last sentence we have touched the field of activity of the Comintern in Hungary. The Russians have an unheard respect for the

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printed letter and therefore, considered the written propaganda of the Hungarian communists as the most important part of their work. They published periodicals; "100 percent" edited by TAMAS Aladar, at present Hungarian minister [redacted] "Social Review" edited by SANDOR Pal, at present professor of Marxism-Leninism at the Budapest University., "Thought" edited by VERTES Gyorgy, at present director of the Parliament Library. Various pamphlets and fly-leaflets were printed periodically in which they tried to popularize actual ^{Moscow} slogans of the times and present them to the Hungarian public. Their effect was minimal. Would the Hungarian police have not confiscated these pamphlets they would have had even less readers by all probability. However, there is no doubt about it, in these periodicals really valuable studies were published sometimes not by communist but by sympathizer writers and journalists. Generally the level of the periodicals and the tone of voice of the pamphlets remained well below the customary intellectual level and this feature and the fact that even well known communist ^{intellig} inclined otherwise well educated and clearthinking people became dull as soon as they accepted active participation in the movement scared away many intellectuals who otherwise were dissatisfied with the Horthy system and flirted with communism. The outsiders could not know and the participants of the movement did not want to know or recognise in their religious fanaticism and trance that they were the worshippers of a mysterious cult, a foreign deity and became its preachers without restraint.

Frankly, this party had no need for talents. They needed soldiers, who giving up the principle of thinking, would blindly execute the received orders. It is symbolic that upon the instructions of Comintern people JOZSEF Attila, the poet was expelled from the party. He could not be broken in to the party discipline and therefore, he was driven to his death. In the last years of his life he became openly enough anti-Soviet,

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in fact he flirted with the arrow-cross Hungarian Nazi movement. This is no wonder, because the social discontent was very great in Hungary and with enough reasons. If the communist would have been ^{smarter} in their activity, most probably they could have attained more serious mass supports. 50X1-HUM

Despite the above listed negative results the Comintern activity had some positive results in Hungary. This effect manifested rather indirectly than directly. The members of the Communist Party were ordered into the ranks of the labor unions and the Social Democratic Party where they had to play an active role. Their roles consisted mostly in the aggravating of various problems. No matter how moderate and sober was the policy of the labor unions and the social democratic party, upon the effect of the exaggerated demands in certain cases they were forced to accept a more radical standpoint ^{than} they would have liked. This refers especially to the wage demands of the 1930-es and to some individual strikes.

Today the connections appear more clearly and it could be established that the Comintern policy and activity in Hungary, but also in other countries, became especially lively when the attention of the Western public opinion had to be diverted from some interior difficulties of the Soviets. The Comintern activity in Hungary brought up world-interest problems when the Russian inner party fights and mass executions disseminated doubts even in the hearts of the adherents, even in the faithful ones. The RAKOSI case is a good example for this method. In 1924 or 1925 RAKOSI was sent to Hungary to work but soon after his arrival was arrested by the Budapest police. At the police RAKOSI "sang", and therefore the Comintern suspended his party membership. RAKOSI's second trial coincided with the great Russian purges and therefore, it

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was invented and decided(allegedly upon the proposition of SZANTO Resse or SZANTO Bela) that a tremendous campaign should be started to shake up international public opinion to save RAKOSI and the reverberations of this great campaign shall drown out the ^{is a 0.5}voices of information caused by the Russian interior struggles. RAKOSI's party membership was quickly restored, and the great campaign "Save RAKOSI" has been started all over the world. The situation was similar in the case of SALLAY and FURST. These two were Comintern agents, and in Budapest rumors were circulated that they were denounced by secret agents of the COMINTERN. Namely the Moscow secretariat was afraid of everybody who had direct connection to the Soviet official organs, and tried to liquidate them. SALLAY and FURST were not Comintern officials but Cheka agents and from here were transferred for Comintern work. KUN Bela and his companions denounced them in their absence as Trotskyists, and allegedly from the highest Soviet authority they(Kun et al) received instructions to make them harmless. This was like killing two birds with one stone, one, they shall get rid of two suspected aberring sheep, and second, at the same time could make useful propaganda for the executed communists. The story seems to be authentic, the more so, because all the so-called "Hungarian secretaries" the leaders of the Communist movement of that time in Hungary who went to the Soviet Union disappeared in Russia during the great purgings. Such a case was for instance that of MADZSAR Jozsef, dentist from Budapest, brother in law of JASZI Oszkar. For years, MADZSAR was one of the most important communists in Hungary, he had an extended circle of friends, even non communist intellectuals gladly visited him because they generally did not know what a role he played in the Hungarian communist movement. Officially, he was a member of the Social Democratic Party in fact he was a co-worker of the "Nepszava"(Peoples Voice) the official paper of the socialist party. At the beginning of the 1930-es there was a cleaning process in progress within the Social Democratic Party,

they tried to get rid of the left wing members, of the suspected communists. At this time MADZSAR was already a member of the leadership of the illegal party and knew well that if he will be expelled of the Social Democratic Party, he shall be arrested by the police. (this was a common practice at that time, the police knew that the social democrats expelled only the communists among their followers and so they were arrested without much ado.) MADZSAR asked permission from the communist party to flee Hungary and went to the Soviet Union. A short time after this he was arrested in Moscow and perished somewhere in Siberia. It is symbolic for the Comintern methods that in Hungary the Russian spread the information through their agents that MADZSAR is working in some high position. Namely, MADZSAR was popular, good hearted, generous, with humanist education, he was a true idealist communist and the Comintern feared that the publication of the truth would have scared away many party members. Only after 1945 came to light what happened to MADZSAR. MADZSAR's wife JASZI Alice, sister of JASZI Oszkar, had a choreographic school at Budapest and deceased shortly after the disappearance of her husband. (The wife of the present foreign minister HORVATH Imre, was a pupil of Mrs.MADZSAR.)

MOLNAR Rene was in the same situation. (He was the brother of MOLNAR Erik, who is still a leading communist functionary) He was a Budapest lawyer, defender of the communists during the trials, and which was not known generally, one of the leaders of the illegal movement. In the middle of the 1930-es he had to flee from Hungary and the party sent him to Moscow. In 1937 he was taken away and during the war perished in one of the Siberian prisoner camps. Naturally, his fate was not known in the Hungarian movement, in fact the Russians did not want to give information even after 1945 to his brother the foreign minister at that time.

Sometimes even the Comintern agents could not escape the fate of the Hungarian party secretaries. It was enough for the Moscow people if somebody attained special popularity in Hungary among the communists, this quasi diminishing their own glories the subject was liquidated. A good example for this behavior is the story of KARIKAS Prigyes who was an autodidact/ worker (selfeducated) who in the years ^{of the} 1920-es was detailed for Comintern work in ~~xxxxx~~ Czechoslovakia [redacted] In the beginning of the 1930-es he was sent to Hungary. Here he worked very bravely. He broke with the general practice of the "foreign secretaries" and contacted not only a few leadership members but had connection to simple party members also, and became very popular. He was recalled to Moscow and disappeared. (KARIKAS by the way was the first husband of ANDICS Erzsebet the illfamed culturpolitical leader of the RAKOSI times. Their daughter was married to FARKAS Vladimir, AVH colonel, son of FARKAS Mihaly.)(BEREI Andor is the second husband of ANDICS Erzsebet. BEREI was an inspector of the Comintern [redacted] and adopted the child from the KARIKAS marriage only after 1945.)

In general the Comintern was suspicious toward all those Hungarian communists who were not arrested by the Hungarian police. According to their opinion or rather more correctly according to the opinion of the NKVD which played a leading role in the direction of the Comintern these communists obviously became agents of the Horthy police and that was the reason they were not arrested. However, this opinion did not exclude the suspicion for those who were arrested because these were suspected that in their confessions they betrayed party or Comintern secrets, and that was the reason that they were not hanged. They could not understand how obvious Soviet agents escaped with shorter-longer jail-sentences. Such thing simply could not happen in their practice and there-

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fore it was not possible at all. According to their theory only the executed were reliable, and naturally those also only after their death. Of course the communists executed by them were not this kind, they were traitor Trotskyists.

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We have already related the role of the Comintern agents sent to Hungary, like RAKOSI and VAS. HORVATH. The present foreign minister also belongs to this group. He was sent back to Hungary with some occasional commission in 1924 but was arrested after a few weeks activity and was in jail until 1945.

At the end of the 1920-ss or in the beginning of the 1930-es (REVAI Jozsef, SZANTO Zoltan, and GERO Erno were also sent back to Hungary by the Comintern. For a while they worked as party secretaries here but sooner or later all of them were arrested and spent a few years (two to four) in jails. REVAI after his release was active [redacted] later became referant or case worker for the [redacted] movement, and still later directed again in the Hungarian section. He did not come back to Hungary but directed the illegal movement for a while through couriers from Czechoslovakia. In Moravska-Ostrava he published a Hungarian language communist paper under the title "Hungarian Day". Here he had a co-worker BETLEN Oskar (president of the editorial committee of the "Szabad Nep" (Free People) in 1954-1956, Stalinist, Rakosi-man, and today vice-president of the editorial committee of the "Nepszabadsag" (Peoples Freedom). BALOGH Edgar was another collaborator of this paper (Hungarian Day) who is in Rumania now, an important representative of the most conservative Stalinist trend, and the ^{Qu?} Kissling of the ~~communist~~ popular Hungarian Federation of Rumania. *Professor at the Regegia University*

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SZANTO Zoltan, (brother in law of REVAI, namely his wife is the sister of REVAI) first directed the Hungarian illegal movement from Czechoslovakia in the beginning of the 1930-es, then later went to Hungary. Here he was arrested, and after his release went to Moscow,

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where he saved his skin during the difficult war years and edited the "New Voice" Hungarian language periodical published in the Soviets. During the war he was one of the editors of the Hungarian broadcasts of the Moscow Radio. On the 4th of November 1956 he together with others went to the Yugoslav legation asking asylum rights but came out of the building with LUKACS Gyorgy, was arrested by the Russians and is still under arrest,-this happened before NAGY Imre left the Legation building and was kidnapped.

GERO's role in Hungary was of a temporary character. He did not play a role in the Hungarian movement, he was probably arrested in Budapest while doing some courier service. He was in jail close to four years and after his release went to Moscow and worked in the Comintern machinery. As an agent he spent some time [] and directed agitation among the intellectuals. His role in the Spanish civil war is well known. He is believed to be ~~him~~ one of the organizers of the [] provocative mass demonstrations. Today this statement seems to be authentic or proven because on the 23 October 1956 he wanted to set the stage and perform the same play at Budapest that brought such a success for him twenty years ago in Barcelona.

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Although it does not belong closely to the subject, the Hungarian policy of the Comintern, but it has to be mentioned as a characteristic cadre exercise that the Comintern always co-operated closely with the Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence organs. Systematically it loaned its own agents to the Army or to the corresponding sections of the NKVD and on the other hand if necessary borrowed agents from them. Several Hungarians worked this way once for the Comintern and later as Soviet intelligence agents or in similar assignments.

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REVESZ Gasa, the present defense minister performed confidential courier service for the Soviet Foreign Ministry for years. REVESZ is ^{an} untalented individual and was not trusted with more serious tasks. However, NOGRADY Sander, who graduated of the Party School of the Comintern, and later worked as a propagandist, performed intelligence service when transferred to the Soviet intelligence branch in the 1930-es, and did regular espionage activity [redacted]

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By 1936 the personal struggles and intrigues increased to such a great proportion within the Comintern -and here I refer in the first place to Hungarian relations - that nobody knew about anybody's connections who belongs to where, who is working for whom, and what. At the same time the international situation also underwent significant changes because Hitler's rule in Germany seemed to be consolidated. The Comintern was forced to change tactics and after trying to discredit the democratic parties for almost twenty years, now it proclaimed the peoples front policy and the unification of the democratic forces.

I do not believe that the following subject has ever been elaborated but it would be worthwhile to spend a few words to explain the role of the Comintern activity in helping the European right wing forces to power. There can be no doubt the Comintern [redacted] through its executive organ the [redacted] Communist party committed everything to undermine the democratic Weimar government. The [redacted] communists fought in the first place against the [redacted] Social Democratic Party and against the other [redacted] democratic parties, starting from that consideration that the strengthening of the [redacted] democracy might bring forth a unified European front, whose destruction from the Soviet viewpoint was a problem of survival.

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The generating force of the Comintern policy was not a simple problem of principles, it was not a question as to whether the social democratic ideology is closer or farther from the Russian interpretation of Marxism but the danger that a democratic Europe will or might present to the masses everything on moral and material field equally what the Soviet system only promised them and by this shall prove the bankruptcy of the Soviet theory and practice. Rather Hitler, than the social-democrats. And, while they were fighting against the socialists, nazism grew too big to handle.

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A few years later [] they killed the democratic [] republic in the same fashion. 50X1-HUM

The same policy was continued in Hungary; primarily they tried to undermine the prestige of the Social democrats and of the young Small Landholders Party. The reasons are obvious. These parties had masses behind them, they wanted democracy and their successes in the long run would have decreased the general discontent. However, the preservation of the general intern discontent everywhere was a vital interest of the Soviet Union.

Further

The Hungarian Communist Party was dissolved in 1936. According to the official motivation of the Comintern, dissolution was resolved because police agents penetrated the party. The execution of this decree was trusted to a Hungarian communist KISS Karelly, who is at present one of the leaders of the party machinery. In 1938 the organisation of the Hungarian Party started again upon the insistence of a few Hungarian communist, rather than on Comintern intention or initiative. At this time the war clouds were already apparent and the Russians did not want communism but peace around their borders. Until Hungary entered the war, in 1941 the Hungarian communists were not permitted to take steps against the Horthy system. They

(the Soviets) did not want to enrage, infuriate Horthy, and would liked to have him not to enter the war. The Hungarian movement was left without direction and guidance, unaccustomed to independence, and in a state of complete disintegration, that was only increased by the disappointment over the Russian-German pact. For a while at least the Comintern has lost its absolute respect. During the war the leaders of the Hungarian Communist movement did play the political game according to their own ideas and capabilities, however, there is no doubt that in these few years, and especially in the resistance movement they followed a national line. This explains their successes in fact this explains also the results of the 1945 clean elections. Namely, they received seventeen percent of the votes at this time, which number considering the education of the Hungarian people and its anti-communist stand is a very great proportion.

Conclusions, summary. We have to emphasize again, that the political fights and personal struggles described in the previous pages were really only a tempest in a tea-pot compared to the whole of the Hungarian political life, - discounting the three last years of the war, when the Soviet influence could not be felt - the effect of the Comintern to the development of the Hungarian political life was minimal, and at the best manifested only indirectly in labor union struggles, wage campaigns, and smaller political campaigns. However, this influence related to the tight circle of the Hungarian communists was primary and surpassing all other factors. The Comintern directed the Hungarian Communist movement - and naturally all others also - with absolute authority not permitting any contradictions. It was (the Comintern) a directing organ of the Communist parties and at the same time the cover organization of the Russian great Power aspirations.

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The COMINFORM created in 1947 was a fundamentally different organisation than its so-called predecessor. The Comintern as we have seen was a directing and executive organ. The Cominform in its ^(substance) ~~substance~~ became a spectacular institute serving primarily propaganda aims. The Comintern embraced the communist parties of the various countries, and against this the Cominform serves as a social meeting place ^(of the leaders) of the already ruling parties.

By 1947 the individual communist parties and especially the parties of the satellite countries were directed by the competent section of the Soviet Party itself, by the (SKBP) Foreign Section of the Central Committee. The leaders of the individual parties received their briefings and practical instructions from here. Generally, every country had one or more case workers in the Central Committee and these were in charge of the general or routine work. Only in very important cases and very seldom could the party leaders of the satellite countries reach and get in personal contact with the bigger Soviet potentates. Therefore, for the direction of the communist parties, for the ideological or practical solidarity there was no need of an international organisation. However, the Soviets as a great power needed a spectacular forum to show the world that it does not supervise simply different parties but plays politics at the head of an important federation-net of countries. Therefore, from time to time the leaders of the countries under communist direction had to be convoked to demonstrate to the world how the Soviet block deliberates and determines its intern and foreign political guiding line with the application of the ~~communist~~ principles of concord and democratic emancipation. This is the picture presented to the outside. In reality, the resolutions are presented ready made by the Russians and the delegates of the satellite countries simply accept them, in fact not only simply accept them but according to

the Russian etiquette enthusiastically greet them.

The foundation of the Cominform itself was a surprise for the member countries. A few days before the beginning of the meeting they received an information that they have to send delegates to Warsaw for an important conference and that one of the delegates has to make a speech. They had no definite advice about the subject of the conference. REVAI Jozsef a member of the Hungarian delegation to the conference related to us one time that he received three days to prepare his address, but did not know at what occasion should he deliver it. It is also interesting that at the end of June 1948 at the famous Cominform meeting of Bucharest, where Tito and Yugoslavia were openly denounced, even RAKOSI had no previous knowledge, though he was one of the most active participants of the anti-Tito intrigues. In June 1948 a Hungarian Government delegation was staying in Warsaw. RAKOSI received word there that he together with the leading personalities of the Polish government has to fly to Bucharest. Even at his departure he did not know the reasons, in fact he believed that the Yugoslavs will be also there to exercise self-criticism. Besides, the whole Yugoslav affair was an inside case of the Cominform. The Hungarian party was informed about the precedents more or less because they forwarded the Politbureau letters to Tito. These letters arrived to Budapest and at these occasions RAKOSI recalled SZANTO Zoltan Hungarian envoy from Belgrade and gave him the ^{sealed} letter for delivery. The other parties have not received information about the development of the Russian-Yugoslav relation; in June 1948 yet the Polish party functionaries referred to Yugoslavia as the most advanced socialist country second only to the Soviet Union.

According to my opinion besides the above listed reasons there were also some intern causes of the creation of the Cominform.

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In 1945-1947 it was seriously considered to create a Balkan-Federation. The Russians, and especially Zdanov wanted to build up a defensive belt on their border that would have showed a friendly face toward the West. Among the interested countries in the first order the leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were the propagators of the plan. However, at the same time the Russians were afraid that such a new federation of countries might perhaps aspire to a greater independence than planned. To prevent this or rather to counteract such move an efficient supervisory organisation seemed necessary, within which they could have played the participating member countries against each other. The Balkan Federation did not come into being but at the ^{closed} Cominform meetings the above mentioned instigations certainly had taken place.

The Moscow descriptions, the personal assessment was the most important factor for the leaders of the satellite countries. Their rule, and perhaps even their life depended on this factor. Observation of the Moscow protocols was always an exciting affair, to find out on some festival occasion on the 1st of May, or on the 7th of November in what order the satellite countries were mentioned, at receptions, dinners, who sat where, who sat next to Stalin, how far down were the others, etc. The party leaders of the Peoples Democratic Countries' ~~sat~~ permanently intrigued against each other. This was very handy for Moscow, because they feared that the parties of the individual countries will perhaps attain a too perfect harmony among each other and might influence the Western parties in their favor, respectively win over the most important communist parties to their side and make a breach in the absolute Soviet hegemony. The Cominform was ^{an} excellent tool and furnished profitable occasions between meeting periods to air and circulate some of the slanders confided

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to Moscow ears and to publish them to the parties. This naturally incited against each other the leaders of the unified communist camps.

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Already on the first meeting in 1947, Tito was prompted to attack [redacted] Tito sharply criticized the after war policy of the

[redacted] communist party, and branded them as undecided, vacillating im-
tent. However, the Russians defended [redacted] The consternation of

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Tito was tremendous because during the preliminary private conversations the Soviet leaders agreed with him. Similar tricks were used in the case of Hungary and Rumania, when the Transylvania problem, respectively the problem of the Hungarian minority communists living in Rumania was brought on the agenda as a matter of discussion. These manoeuvres served only one purpose, that the Russians should be able to prove and accentuate to their vassals in every single and in all cases that without their administering justice they would run into difficulties.

The above clearly shows that the Cominform was not a political governing body. The actual "line" to be followed was not communicated on public conferences, conversations with the leaders of the individual parties but was handed down to them in the form of direct instructions. The satellite countries did not enjoy any independence at all, could not form or declare an opinion with regard to the Soviet resolutions and at the most could only slighting each other.

The Cominform had no official machinery. First it published a paper in Belgrade, later in Bucharest, every country sent a delegate to the editorial office but their function was restricted in the most fortunate cases only to translations. The paper itself obtained its material from second hand sources, from Pravda foreign policy articles, reports of the

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leaders of the satellite parties which already appeared in the Pravda, etc. From time to time this paper published scholastic editorials which either repeated only anti-imperialist well known ~~known~~ phrases or exercised criticism over the parties of the satellite countries, or respectively later contained attacks against Yugoslavia.

NEMES Desso, the present president of the editorial committee of the "Nepszabadsag"(Peoples Freedom) was the Hungarian delegate at the Seminform periodical, and later he was replaced by BETLEN Oszkar, respectively he was transferred to Bucharest. BIRO Zoltan was the representative of the paper in Hungary in 1947-1948. BIRO is the brother of RAKOSI.

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